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“It is [the] two-track labor market, rather than austerity, that is the biggest threat 
to the persistence of the European social model.”
Europe’s Social Safety Net Under Pressure
GIULIANO BONOLI
Since the oil shocks of the 1970s, Europe has more or less constantly worried about the sustainability of its economic and social 
model, which is based on high levels of income 
redistribution and extensive social insurance. 
Over the years, though, the standard view has 
emphasized the resilience of European welfare 
states. True, some of the most generous programs 
were cut back in the 1980s and 1990s, depend-
ing on the country, but at the same time benefits 
rapidly expanded in other areas such as child-
care services. Perhaps most importantly, the key 
defining features of the European social model—
protection against the main life-course risks of 
old age, sickness, and unemployment—remained 
strong. European welfare systems proved to be as 
resilient as expected during the economic crises of 
the 1970s and 1990s.
Arguably, things will be different this time. 
The world is still recovering from the post-2008 
financial crisis, and some European countries are 
dealing with anemic economic growth, high unem-
ployment, and troublesome public finances. The 
reforms undertaken in response to this crisis have 
affected the core of the European social model to 
a much greater extent than previous adjustments, 
especially in some Southern European countries, 
sometimes referred to as “peripheral.” For the first 
time since the end of World War II, cohorts of 
Italians and Spaniards are moving toward retire-
ment without adequate social protection, and it is 
very difficult to see how, in the current context, 
this trend can be reversed. 
Only a return to reasonable levels of economic 
growth in the peripheral countries will allow 
Europe to preserve its economic and social model. 
Future reforms should be based on this under-
standing and promote economic growth in both 
direct and indirect ways.
LONG-TERM IMBALANCES 
Europe has entered the post-2008 world with 
a series of unresolved challenges confronting its 
welfare states. The first and most important is 
population aging. Fertility rates (the number of 
children a woman is likely to have during her 
reproductive life) plummeted across the conti-
nent from the 1960s through the 1980s. In most 
countries, they have remained very low ever since. 
Germany has had a rate of 1.3 to 1.4 children 
per woman since the 1980s. In Southern Europe, 
fertility rates fell to even lower levels (Italy’s was 
1.2 in the 1990s). They have slightly recovered 
since then, mostly thanks to higher rates among 
immigrant women.
This long-term decline in fertility rates, com-
bined with longer life expectancies, has resulted 
in a serious funding problem for the generous old-
age pension systems in place throughout the con-
tinent. Pensions were particularly attractive (and 
thus costly) in continental Southern and Western 
Europe, with the retirement age sometimes set as 
low as 60 or even lower.
A second crucial trend concerns changes in the 
labor market, an issue faced not only by Europe 
but by all advanced economies. Technological 
progress and the transfer of many productive 
activities to emerging markets (China above all) 
have resulted in labor demand in advanced econ-
omies being highly skewed toward the upper 
end of the skill distribution. In their European 
offices, firms need engineers, marketing special-
ists, accountants, and so forth. Meanwhile, there 
is steadily declining demand for low-skilled and 
unskilled labor, including all sorts of machine 
operators and manual workers.
To some extent, this development in labor 
demand has occurred in tandem with a gen-
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eral upgrading of skills among workers in most 
advanced economies. However, there is still a big 
imbalance in the low-skilled segment of the labor 
market, where supply vastly exceeds demand. 
This structural change is a problem for wel-
fare states. Low-skilled individuals have greater 
difficulty accessing stable employment and are 
overrepresented in various social programs. This 
generates higher government spending and prob-
lems of exclusion from mainstream society that 
can be extremely worrisome in the long term.
Furthermore, the imbalance between supply 
and demand affects the quality of the low-skill 
jobs that are created. In such a context, wages can 
be very low—far below what is needed to live a 
decent life. In response, several European coun-
tries, including Britain and Germany, have adopt-
ed mandatory minimum wages. But low-wage 
employment and a generous welfare state do not 
sit comfortably together. The benefits may give 
unemployed recipients an incentive to stay on 
welfare rather than take a job, especially since the 
available low-skill jobs not only 
are poorly paid—they tend to 
be unrewarding, repetitive, and 
physically demanding as well.
European societies have also 
become more multicultural 
over the years. To some extent, 
this third trend can be under-
stood with reference to aging populations. Given 
their low fertility rates, many countries would be 
experiencing population decline were it not for 
migration. Europe has discovered that managing 
a multicultural society is not easy. Migrants take 
some of the (rare) low-skill jobs but are also more 
likely to end up on welfare. Migrants are overrep-
resented in many social programs, but they also 
experience discrimination in the labor market 
and in society as a whole. Their presence has been 
exploited by opportunistic political entrepreneurs 
of the extreme right, who have been very success-
ful in several European countries over the past 
few years.
ATYPICAL WORKERS
Finally, a fourth trend that is essential to under-
standing current developments in European wel-
fare states is the process of “dualization” in 
the labor markets of several countries, creat-
ing different tiers of job protection. In these 
countries, mostly in continental Western and 
Southern Europe, labor law traditionally provid-
ed very high levels of employment security for 
all workers. Businesses contemplating collective 
or individual terminations often face substantial 
administrative hurdles. In recent years, employ-
ers have put pressure on governments to deregu-
late these highly rigid labor markets and limit 
job protection rules. Labor market deregulation, 
however, has met with strenuous opposition 
from trade unions.
The result is that governments have allowed 
the introduction of a range of unprotected labor 
contracts that employers can use as an alterna-
tive to the highly protected ones that still exist. 
These new contract types, sometimes classified 
as “atypical,” consist of temporary contracts, con-
tracts for self-employed individuals, and contracts 
for jobs at rates of pay below a certain threshold. 
What these new contracts have in common is the 
fact that they do not provide protection against 
dismissal. They generally also do not generate 
rights to social insurance such as unemployment 
or retirement benefits.
Dualization represents a 
major challenge to the European 
model of society. In countries 
such as Italy, Spain, France, 
and Germany, a substantial pro-
portion of job creation since 
the 1990s has been achieved 
through the expansion of these 
types of atypical jobs. As a result, relatively large 
cohorts of workers are heading toward retirement 
without accumulating any form of entitlement to 
a pension.
THE HARD AND THE SOFT
Europe has entered the post-2008 world with 
these problems still largely unresolved. They have 
been compounded by the most severe economic 
crisis experienced by the global economy since 
the end of World War II. What’s more, the cri-
sis has exposed some faults in the design of the 
European project that have led to huge imbalances 
across the continent.
The adoption of the single currency in 1999 
by 11 (now 19) member states of the European 
Union removed an important tool of adjustment 
from the economic policy repertoires of these 
countries: devaluation. Throughout the post-
war years, soft-currency countries (such as Italy, 
France, and Greece), could afford comparatively 
high rates of wage growth and inflation without 
endangering the competitiveness of their econo-
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mies. They could easily compensate by devaluing 
their currency every few years.
In contrast, hard-currency countries such as 
Germany had to keep wage growth, public spend-
ing, and inflation under tight control. With the 
adoption of the euro, Germany and other coun-
tries accustomed to living with a hard-currency 
regime enjoyed a tremendous advantage relative 
to former soft-currency countries that were totally 
unfamiliar with the kind of tight discipline in 
wage growth and public spending that a hard-
currency regime requires.
Putting former soft- and hard-currency coun-
tries together in a currency union has generated 
tremendous tensions and imbalances. On one side 
are Germany and a few other countries that manage 
to adhere to the fiscal and wage-growth discipline 
imposed by the union, and on the other side is the 
rest of the continent. Because of these imbalances, 
the impact of the crisis on welfare states differs 
dramatically between the former hard-currency 
and soft-currency countries. In Germany, austerity 
measures were adopted before 2008. Since then, 
Germany has mostly made adjustments to the wel-
fare system while adopting new measures to boost 
incomes for the most disadvantaged, such as the 
introduction of a mandatory minimum wage in 
2015, at 8.50 euros per hour.
Things went differently in the peripheral coun-
tries, which were fighting a major debt crisis. 
They were forced to adopt radical austerity mea-
sures that have arguably changed the face of their 
welfare states.
INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS
Austerity was particularly radical in Southern 
Europe, where reforms made high-cost pension 
systems less generous. Unlike the previous reforms 
of the 1990s and 2000s, which were adopted under 
moderate fiscal pressure, governments this time 
needed to generate savings immediately. So, for 
the first time in postwar history, countries includ-
ing Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Hungary had 
to cut the pensions of current retirees. Previous 
reforms usually affected only future retirees while 
leaving current pensions untouched, reflecting 
the idea that “acquired rights” to benefits must be 
protected as if they were property rights.
Some countries also decided to raise the retire-
ment age, which is a highly effective measure 
to restore a balanced pension budget because it 
simultaneously increases the number of contribu-
tors to state pension funds while decreasing the 
number of recipients. In recent years, increases in 
the retirement age were adopted not only in Italy 
and Greece but also in the Netherlands, Finland, 
and Denmark. In addition to these radical mea-
sures, more typical steps were adopted in several 
countries, such as increases in payroll taxes ear-
marked for old-age pensions and reductions in the 
generosity of benefit indexation for inflation.
Taken together, these reforms are changing the 
meaning of retirement for many current workers 
who will either have to work longer or accept con-
siderably lower pensions. One group that is clear-
ly not going to enjoy a comfortable retirement is 
the relatively large cohort of atypical workers who 
have entered the labor force since the 1990s in 
countries with rigid labor markets such as Italy, 
Spain, and France, where much job creation has 
consisted of temporary jobs, self-employment, or 
other forms of atypical work that is not covered 
well or at all by the welfare state. These workers 
are suffering from the twin pressures of a more 
unstable labor market and a less generous public 
pension system.
Atypical workers are penalized not only in 
relation to pensions. They are also largely unpro-
tected against most other employment-related 
social risks, such as unemployment, sickness, 
and disability. Some commentators describe the 
labor market and also society at large as dualized, 
meaning that an increasingly profound division is 
emerging between insiders and outsiders. Insiders 
still have access to standard employment protec-
tion against dismissal and relatively good levels 
of social insurance. Outsiders alternate between 
periods of low-paid employment and unemploy-
ment, are not protected by dismissal laws since 
they work with atypical contracts, and do not 
receive much protection from the welfare state.
It is this two-track labor market, rather than 
austerity, that is the biggest threat to the persis-
tence of the European social model. It stems from 
the inability of European governments to spread 
the cost of economic adjustment evenly across 
social classes. Weak governments have imposed 
losses on weak social groups, with the conse-
quence that they are excluded from the social 
contract that made Europe a unique place in terms 
of social cohesion and equality in the second half 
of the twentieth century.
Who is excluded? It is difficult to clearly iden-
tify the outsiders in European welfare states. The 
notion of dualization is a broad and crude sim-
plification of the real world, and being excluded 
from the European social model is in fact a mat-
ter of degrees. However, workers with atypical 
contracts are systematically overrepresented in 
disadvantaged groups such as people living in 
poor households and the long-term unemployed. 
In general, low-skill status is a common charac-
teristic of outsiders. They also tend to be young, 
migrants, or individuals saddled by family-related 
risks such as single parenthood. Members of these 
groups may experience levels of economic insecu-
rity that are atypical for Europe.
DEREGULATORY COLLUSION
The trend toward dualization is strongest in 
continental Southern and Western Europe, par-
ticularly in countries like Italy, Spain, and France, 
but also in Germany. They have followed a com-
mon path toward a dualized society. The starting 
point was a highly rigid labor market. In all these 
countries, employee protection against dismissal 
in particular was considered by employers, as well 
as by most labor economists, to be too strong.
Starting in the 1990s, 
attempts were made to loosen 
employment protections. Those 
attempts were usually blocked 
by powerful labor unions, 
which were not averse to stag-
ing major strikes and protest 
actions, most notably in coun-
tries such as France and Italy that have a strong 
tradition of union-led mobilization. Faced with 
such seemingly insurmountable opposition, gov-
ernments decided to take an easier route. Rather 
than deregulate standard employment contracts, 
they would create new varieties with few protec-
tions and allow employers to use these contracts 
instead of the standard ones.
At one stage, Italy had over 30 different types of 
employment contracts. One of them was the stan-
dard, open-ended, well-protected contract. The 
others were various forms of atypical contracts for 
temporary and self-employed work. In Germany, 
atypical contracts known as mini-jobs existed 
before the 1990s, and were meant to provide extra 
income to students and housewives. They were 
deregulated in the 1990s, and have since become 
common for all types of work. In both countries, 
much of the employment expansion during the 
late 1990s and 2000s was based on such contracts, 
not the standard ones.
Labor unions, while fiercely opposed to the 
deregulation of the standard employment con-
tract, acquiesced in these reforms. Their core 
members did not see their protection reduced. In a 
way, dualization can be seen as the result of a form 
of collusion between governments and unions. 
Governments were under pressure from business 
groups, as well as from international and suprana-
tional organizations such as the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development and the 
EU, to deregulate the labor market. Unions had to 
protect the interests of their members. The result 
was the concentration of the cost of reform on 
the weakest in society, those who we now term 
“outsiders.”
MULTI-ETHNIC FUTURE
Increased levels of migration have also been a 
major trend throughout Europe in the past several 
years, rising to unprecedented levels in 2015. The 
geopolitical instability on Europe’s doorstep, part-
ly a result of the Arab Spring uprisings that began 
in 2011, has prompted hundreds of thousands of 
asylum seekers to head north. Europe was totally 
unprepared to deal with such 
a massive inflow of people, 
which is understandable. The 
sheer numbers involved make 
the problem daunting.
However, Europe has a longer- 
term problem that relates to 
migration. There are few coun-
tries on the aging continent that can avoid popula-
tion decline without resorting to mass immigration. 
France and perhaps a few Nordic countries have 
managed over the past decade or so to sustain fertil-
ity rates close to two children per woman, the level 
needed to secure the replacement of a population. 
For most other countries in Europe, without mas-
sive immigration the most likely future is one of 
population decline. With a fertility rate of 1.5 chil-
dren per woman, each new cohort has a size equal 
to three-quarters of the previous one. Project this 
over four or five generations and the population 
shrinks to a small fraction of what it was before the 
demographic transition began.
If Europe wants to avoid population decline, 
it has no other option than to accept mass immi-
gration and turn into a multicultural society. 
This is not speculation. It is already happening 
throughout the continent. From Sweden to Italy, 
from Portugal to Hungary, European countries are 
becoming increasingly multi-ethnic. The problem 
is that this process generates huge tensions. Most 
Europeans are used to living in ethnically and 
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religiously homogeneous societies. Many of them 
have trouble accepting the presence of different 
lifestyles, values, and behaviors.
WELFARE CHAUVINISM
Those tensions are magnified by the fact that 
immigration usually occurs in an economic con-
text in which relatively large sections of the popu-
lation have experienced social suffering because 
of economic transformations, or, as has recently 
been the case, during times of crisis. The losers 
in these processes are essentially lower-middle-
class individuals and families. The labor market 
has become particularly difficult for them because 
technological progress has destroyed many semi-
skilled jobs (such as secretarial and back-office 
staff positions). As a result, they are often forced 
to accept employment in the low-skilled segment 
of the labor market, and enter into direct com-
petition with low-skilled migrants. Competition 
between low-to-mid-skilled natives and migrants 
also happens in other contexts, such as the hous-
ing market. 
One result is that the los-
ers in the current econom-
ic transformation are easily 
mobilized by political entre-
preneurs who promise to 
stop the trend toward a mul-
ticultural society and severely 
limit migration. Anti-immigration parties have 
had success in several European countries over 
the past decade. France’s National Front has won 
more than 25 percent of the popular vote in its 
best showings at the ballot box, and is kept out 
of power only by an electoral system in which 
mainstream parties cooperate against it. In the 
Nordic countries, anti-immigrant parties have 
also done well over the past few years, winning 
between 10 and 20 percent of the vote in the 
most recent elections.
Regarding the welfare state, these parties tend 
to share a common view, known in the specialist 
literature as “welfare chauvinism.” Unlike other 
right-wing parties, they favor a generous welfare 
state but one that is limited to nationals and 
gives little to migrants. The financial problems 
that are forcing European welfare states to cut 
benefits would be solved, they insist, through 
reducing the number of claimants by halting 
immigration. Welfare chauvinism appeals to the 
losers in the ongoing economic transformation 
because it promises them good-quality social 
protection and services while excluding a new 
class of losers.
There are, of course, several problems with 
the welfare chauvinism vision. The most impor-
tant is its inability to deal with the demographic 
problem. If dependency on the welfare state 
is increasing, this is not so much because of 
immigration. An aging population is a much 
bigger factor. As larger cohorts reach retirement 
age, spending on old-age pensions increases. 
With an aging society, cutting migration is not 
only an ineffective way to restore the fiscal 
balance of the welfare state. It is counterpro-
ductive, because it reduces the size of the working- 
age population. An aging population needs as 
many working-age people as possible to sustain 
the welfare state with their tax contributions.
THE GROWTH CURE
It is difficult today to talk about what is happen-
ing to welfare states in Europe in terms of com-
mon trends because we are seeing a divergence 
between the countries that 
can keep up with Germany (in 
productivity growth and com-
petitiveness) and the rest. The 
former include Austria, the 
Netherlands, and the Nordic 
countries. Tellingly, these are 
all countries that had already 
more or less tightly linked their national curren-
cies to the Deutsche mark before the introduction 
of the single currency. This accustomed them to 
the discipline imposed by a fixed exchange rate 
pegged to the industrial giant of Europe. These 
countries have to deal with many of the same 
demographic and economic challenges facing 
other European countries, but they can do so on a 
sound economic footing. 
Then there are the peripheral countries, which 
were accustomed to devaluing their currencies 
periodically against the Deutsche mark. They 
include Italy, Spain, and Greece, to name a few. 
These countries have been losing competitive-
ness over the years, failing to contain increases in 
wages and public spending, and are now unable to 
devalue to cope with the crisis. 
A return to economic growth seems to be a 
necessary condition for the preservation of the 
European welfare state. But how? Many interven-
tions that can bring growth back are outside the 
remit of the welfare state: investment in research 
and development; expansion of education and 
Workers are heading toward 
retirement without any form 
of entitlement to a pension.
high-quality vocational training; wage modera-
tion; an accommodating monetary policy; good 
infrastructure; social stability.
Nonetheless, the welfare state can make a con-
tribution to stronger growth. It should provide a 
fair level of income replacement to those who can-
not work, without undermining work incentives 
with overly generous benefits. It should provide 
training and other assistance to those who are out-
side the labor market, so that they can find new 
jobs. It should provide free child-care services 
and other benefits for working people, such as tax 
credits, so that parents can more easily reconcile 
work and family obligations.
The welfare state does not need to be a problem 
weighing on European economies. It can be part 
of the solution to their current woes, and it can 
act as a catalyst of economic growth. In order to 
do so, however, it must change. The welfare state 
that Europe needs will be based somewhat less 
on income protection and more on investment, 
less on income transfers and more on services. 
Investing in children and in people’s human capi-
tal—their education and skills—should be a top 
priority.
This vision, sometimes referred to as a “social 
investment” welfare state, is promoted by many 
experts and international agencies. However, 
investment-oriented social policies have failed to 
generate the kind of mass support that is needed to 
push politicians to act. Yet if Europe wants to leave 
the crisis behind, stop economic decline, and avoid 
growing internal divisions, it must be prepared to 
invest massively in its own people. !
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